One of the criticisms routinely advanced against models with staggered contracts is their inability to generate inflation persistence. This paper finds that staggered contracts à la Taylor are, in fact, capable of reproducing the inflation persistence implied by U.S. data. Following Fuhrer and Moore, I capture the moments that the model needs to replicate by using the correlograms from a small vector autoregression (VAR). I estimate the contract parameters using the method of maximum likelihood. The correlogram of inflation for the contract model is very close to the correlogram from the VAR. By the same metric, Taylor contracts fare poorly in reproducing the comovements of inflation and output.
have argued this point for the U.S. include: Brainard and Perry (2000) , Kim, Nelson, and Piger (2001) , Cogley and Sargent (2001) . This prompts two obvious questions. First, do we really need Fuhrer-Moore contracts, or do Taylor contracts generate reasonable inflation persistence for the most recent period? I find that, including the 1990s in the estimation sample, the inflation persistence implied by Taylor contracts adequately captures the U.S. data. This finding supports the view that the earlier experience might have been driven by shifts in monetary policy. As shown by Erceg and Levin (2003) , who studied the Volcker disinflation, the higher inflation persistence could have simply been the result of uncertainty over monetary policy. In line with the theoretical analysis of Ball (1994) , I also find that Taylor contracts do not replicate the comovements between inflation and output. The Fuhrer-Moore contracts perform better in this dimension.
Second, positing an interest rate reaction function whose parameters are timeinvariant, are the estimates for the parameters in the contracting specification consistent with the recent lower persistence of inflation? Indeed, by splitting the sample into two subsamples, the estimated parameters would pick up a change in the persistence of inflation, even if the underlying cause were a shift in monetary policy. West (1988) provided a theoretical analysis of the link between monetary policy and the persistence of real output and inflation for a model with two-period Taylor contracts. West showed that the weight on the output measure in Taylor contracts influences the persistence of output, as well as the persistence of inflation. Here, I find that the estimated parameters of the contracting specification move consistently with lower persistence, but the shift is not statistically significant.
In previous work, Guerrieri (2001) found that a staggered contracts setup as in Calvo (1983) produced a better fit to the U.S. data than staggered contracts of one single fixed duration à la Taylor. 2 In this paper I show how to allow for multiple contracts of fixed duration à la Taylor, in a way that can be mapped into a profit maximization exercise, and that is still parsimonious in terms of the size of the implied state space. Allowing for a distribution of contract durations makes Taylor staggered contracts closer to the Calvo counterparts. The single contract duration is rejected by the data, substantiating that this development has empirical relevance.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows: in Section 1, I build some intuition for the difference between standard contracts and relative contracts; in Section 2, I describe the vector autoregression (VAR) estimation. In Section 3, I outline the maximum-likelihood estimation and report the estimation results. Section 4 concludes.
COMPARING STANDARD AND RELATIVE CONTRACTS
Following the terminology in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , I will henceforth call "standard" the price contracts of Taylor (1980) and relative the price contracts of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) .
The typical structure behind staggered price contracts is an environment of monopolistically competitive firms that are faced with a constraint on price adjustment. Following Taylor (1980) , firms are allowed to reset their contract price every n periods. Firms are otherwise symmetric in every other respect. At any period, n overlapping contracts are in force. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) showed that profit maximization implies a first order condition for a firm resetting its price at time t that, by log-linearizing, leads to:
where P t is the log of the contract price set at time t, Ỹ t is an output measure and E t denotes expectations conditional on the information set available at time t. This also happens to be be the contracting specification chosen by Taylor (1980) . 3 The log of the aggregate price, is then given by:
Combining Equations (1) and (2), setting n ϭ 2, allowing for the fact that under rational expectations E tϪ1 P t ϭ P t Ϫ ε t (where ε is a forecast error), and finally reworking the price equation in terms of inflation, denoted by π t , one obtains the Phillips curve equation: Fuhrer and Moore (1995) argued that the persistence imparted to inflation by the standard contracting specification does not fit the U.S. inflation data as well as their relative specification. Their alternative model can be summarized by the following equations, where each variable is to be thought in log deviation from steady state. The contract equation is the following:
The Relative Contract Model
where P t is the price contract that starts in period t, P t is the aggregate price level, and Ỹ t is an output measure. The aggregate price level is still governed by Equation (2). V t is a relative price index, that takes the following form:
Then, for n ϭ 2, the Phillips curve equation implied by this contracting specification takes the form:
Comparing Equations (3) and (6), one can immediately see that the relative contract specification, for any given contract length, appends an extra lag of inflation to the Phillips curve equation.
Allowing for Multiple Contract Lengths
Rather than maintaining that all contracts last n periods, a more flexible setup would allow for a distribution of contract durations. Blinder (1994) argued that this setup would also be more plausible. A simple way to model this distribution is to assume that when firms set a price, they face uncertainty over the contract duration. The price they set might be in force for any length of time between one and n periods. Firms do know, however, the relevant probabilities. Then, let θ 1 be the probability that a contract will be in force only one period, let θ 2 be the probability that a contract will be in force for two periods, and so on. Let the vector θ summarize the relevant contract weights. The elements of θ are all nonnegative and sum to 1. Fixing the longest contract duration at four periods (n ϭ 4), the aggregate price level becomes
The setup of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) can be reinterpreted to conform to this setup. One way to impose some structure on the distribution of contract lengths would be to pick a functional form for the weights on contract prices in Equation (7). Letting f i denote the weight on the contract price with lag i, Equation (7) would then be rewritten as
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) imposed that
where s is the only parameter governing the shape of the distribution of contract durations. To be able to match a choice for s into a vector θ, s needs to be contained in the interval between 0 and 1/6. 4 In Table 1 , I show how to map selected values of s into a set of contract weights θ 1 to θ 4 . 5 As s decreases, the weight on the longer contracts increases. In this stochastic contract setup, the contract price rule for the standard model becomes
For the relative contract setup, following Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , one obtains
where V t can be substituted into Equation (11) from Equation (5).
Nesting the Two Models
Let δ govern the fraction of agents using relative contracts. Then the standard and the relative contract models can be nested by letting the contract price equation become
where the index V n t is given by
VAR ESTIMATION
In order to assess the properties of the data that the contracting specification needs to reproduce, I rely on a simple statistical model that takes the form of a Notes: s governs the distribution of contract durations. θ 1 to θ 4 are the probabilities that a contract will last 1 to 4 periods, respectively. f 0 to f 3 are the weights in the aggregate price of contract prices set from the current period to 3 periods ago, respectively.
4. This is equivalent to the condition imposed by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) that the polynomial in the lag operator used to rewrite the aggregate price equation be invertible.
5. I show the calculations underlying this mapping in an appendix available upon request.
VAR. Detrended output and inflation are the series of interest. Following Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , and Coenen and Wieland (2000) , I include the short-term nominal interest rate in the VAR to help in the formation of output expectations. Thus the three endogenous variables in the VAR are detrended log of output, inflation and the short-term interest rate. Just as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) , the series for the above variables come from the productivity release of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The measure of output that I consider is the linearly detrended log of the nonfarm business output per person. The measure of inflation comes from a quarterly difference in the log of the nonfarm business output deflator. Finally, the interest rate series is the three-month Treasury bill rate from the secondary market quoted on a discount basis.
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To decide the number of lags for the endogenous variables in the VAR equations, I followed the general-to-specific approach. To test for correlation, I used a Portmanteau test on lag 12. I settled on a VAR specification that included three lags of all the endogenous variables. I excluded the intercept term from the VAR structure to ensure a zero-inflation steady state, consistent with the two contracting specifications in this paper. 7 The conclusions reported below are resilient to reintroducing a constant in the VAR. Excluding the constant does affect the shape of the correlogram for inflation and the interest rate from the VAR. Without a constant, the inflation persistence implied by the VAR appears to be higher, thus making it harder for the standard contract specification to reproduce such a feature of the data.
I show the correlograms and cross-correlograms for the endogenous variables for the sample 1983q3-2003q3 in Figure 1 (which also includes the correlograms from the maximum-likelihood estimation described below). The correlogram has the advantage over impulse response functions of not requiring an identification scheme. I also report a 90% confidence interval around the correlograms. This is calculated using the Monte Carlo procedure described by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) .
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION
In order to estimate the structural parameters in the standard and in the relative contracting specification, I replace the inflation equation in the VAR with the relevant contract equations. I link prices to inflation by using
Therefore, in the case of standard contracts, I estimate a model that includes the 6. I use a linear detrending procedure to ensure comparability with the results of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) . In detrending, I have considered both single as well as multiple trends with breaks in 1983 and 1992. The additional trends do not appear to affect the results. Here, I report only the results using one trend.
7. The parameter estimates for the VAR are relegated to an appendix available upon request. A likelihood ratio test confirms the validity of the restriction that the constant term be zero.
price Equations (8), (10), and (14), plus the interest rate and the output equations from the VAR.
In the case of relative contracts, I estimate a model that includes the price Equations (5), (8), (11), and (14), plus the interest rate and the output equations from the VAR. For the purposes of estimation, I augment the contract price equation in both models with an observational error that I call ε P , t .
In both cases, the state space is given by X t ≡ (P t ,π t ,P t ,Ỹ t ,r t )′. For any choice of the parameters γ and s, by standard methods, one can find the vector autoregressive representation for the variables in the state space, which can then be written as
where ε t ϭ (ε y , t , ε r , t , ε P , t )′, while A 1 , A 2 , A 3 , and B are conformable matrices of coefficients (which can be thought of as functions of s and γ). This system of equations, however, still holds two identities. I then split the state space X t into two parts, S t and Z t . S t is defined as S t ≡ (P t ,P t )′, while Z t is defined as Z t ≡ (Ỹ t , r t ,π t )′. I rewrite Equation (15) as
To form the likelihood function, I follow Harvey (1981) , and condition on the first observation. I use the innovation representation of Equation (16), assuming that ε t is identically and independently distributed across time as normal. To form the likelihood, the last hurdle to overcome is that the contract price P t is unobserved. To remedy this, I adopt the following procedure. I assume that P t , prior to 1947, is in steady state (the series available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics start in 1947). Given a choice for γ and s, I use Equation (16) to back out ε t . Using Equations (15) and (16), I then dynamically generate a series for P t and ε t . In order to dilute the assumption that P t be in steady state prior to 1947, I use data for the period between 1947 and the start of the estimation sample as a presample, with the sole purpose of initializing the value of P t . I have used Monte Carlo experiments to confirm that given the length of the presample, the initial value of P t becomes irrelevant. I maximize the likelihood using a Newton-Raphson based algorithm. To verify that the output of the algorithm maximizes the likelihood function, I use a linear-search procedure.
Estimation Results
The estimation results are summarized in Tables 2-4. Table 2 reports the estimates for the relative contract model. Regressions 1 and 2 differ by the starting date of the sample. In Regression 1, whose sample starts in 1983q1, s, the parameter governing the distribution of contract durations, is estimated at 0.0503, with a standard error of 0.0175. The implied distribution of contract durations is the following: 5% of contracts last one quarter, 10% two quarters, 15% three quarters, 70% four quarters. The weight of the output measure in the contract equations, γ, is estimated at 0.0153 with a standard error of 0.0057. Both estimates are highly statistically significant. The variation in s over different samples is not statistically significant. The estimate of γ drops in Regression 2, when the sample starts in 1965q1. In a model with standard contracts, West (1988) showed that a lower value of γ implies higher persistence of inflation (and output). Therefore, the drop a The parameter s determines the distribution of contract durations, see Equation (9); γ determines the weight of the output measure in the price contracts, see Equation (10); δ determines the weight on relative contracts in the nesting model, see Equation (12). Standard errors are in parentheses.
b See Equation (15), where ε t ≡ (ε y , t , ε P , t , ε r , t )′. a The parameter s determines the distribution of contract durations, see Equation (9); γ determines the weight of the output measure in the price contracts, see Equation (11); δ determines the weight on relative contracts in the nesting model, see Equation (12). Standard errors are in parentheses.
b See Equation (15), where
in the estimated value of γ is consistent with a higher persistence of the inflation process in the 1960s and 1970s. Table 3 reports the estimates for the relative contract specification. For Regression 1, whose sample spans 1983q1-2003q3, the estimate for s is 0.0895, with a standard deviation of 0.0169. For the same sample, the parameter γ is estimated to be 0.0083, not statistically significantly different from the weight of the output measure in the regression for standard contracts. For Regression 2, whose sample covers 1965q1-2003q3, the estimates for s and γ are not statistically significantly different from the estimates of Regression 1. Table 4 reports the estimates for a contracting specification that nests both the relative and the standard model. The fraction of agents adopting relative contracts, δ, is estimated in the order of 80% regardless of the start of the sample. The estimate is statistically significant at standard confidence levels.
The likelihood ratio for the restriction that the nesting model includes only the standard or the relative contract specification can be easily calculated from the log likelihoods reported in Tables 2-4. Given that only one parameter is being fixed, the likelihood-ratio test statistic is distributed as χ 2 with one degree of freedom. This implies that for a 5% significance level, the log-likelihood of the nesting model a The parameter s determines the distribution of contract durations, see Equation (9); γ determines the weight of the output measure in the price contracts, see Equation (12); δ determines the weight on relative contracts in the nesting model, see Equation (12). Standard errors are in parentheses.
b See Equation (15), where ε t ≡ (ε y , t , ε P , t , ε r , t )′.
minus the log-likelihood of the restricted model needs to be less than 2 in order to accept the null hypothesis that the restriction is valid. A quick glance at Tables 2-4 reveals that the standard model is rejected, while the relative model fails to be rejected. Not only is the standard model rejected for the longer sample, but it is also rejected for the shorter sample reported. I have experimented with samples starting as late as 1985, for which results are not reported for reasons of space. This finding is robust to further shortening the sample, as well as to the introduction of multiple trends in the detrending of output. Intuition for the above finding can be gained by studying Figures 1 and 2 , which show the cross-correlograms for the standard and the relative contract model, as well as for the VAR (including the 90% confidence interval). Each of the figures focuses on one of the two estimation samples discussed above. Where there appear to be significant differences between the standard and relative contracts is in the cross-correlogram for output and lagged inflation and in the cross-correlogram for inflation and lagged output. While these two cross-correlograms are always within the 90% confidence band for the relative contracts, they wander outside the band 1965q1-2003q31) for the standard contracts. The likelihood ratio test picks up this difference in performance, leading to a rejection of standard contracts.
Interestingly, one can see that across samples the correlogram for inflation using standard contracts is very close to the correlogram for inflation using relative contracts. In turn, both are close to the correlogram for the VAR, and are always included in the 90% confidence interval. The conjecture of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) that the inflation persistence of standard contracts was inadequate is not robust to the inclusion of the 1990s in the estimation sample.
8 Adding the 1990s, the standard model performs as well as the relative model in reproducing the inflation persistence as measured by the correlogram from the nonstructural VAR. However, the standard model does not perform as well as the relative contract model in replicating the comovements between output and inflation. This is why a likelihood ratio test rejects the standard model.
CONCLUSIONS
I have used a simple VAR to capture the properties of the data that a contract model needs to reproduce. When the experience of the 1990s is included in the estimation sample, the results presented indicate that the contract model of Taylor (1980) performs as well as the relative contract model featured in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) at reproducing the inflation persistence observed in the U.S. data. Both types of contract specifications come close to replicating the inflation correlogram captured by a simple, nonstructural VAR. The results at hand differ from those in Fuhrer and Moore (1995) because of the longer data sample now available. Overall, the relative contract model does fit the data better than the standard contract model. However, the capacity to generate inflation persistence does not appear to be the major difference driving the results. The cross-correlograms for inflation and output, at small lags, are where I observe a better performance for the relative contract model. Where the standard contract model fails is in accounting for the cross correlation between inflation and output. LITERATURE CITED Ball, Laurence (1994 8. Using the sample from 1965 to 1993 (as Fuhrer and Moore were constrained to do), I can obtain estimates of the parameters for the relative contract model but not for the standard model. These estimates are in line with the ones originally reported by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) . Fuhrer and Moore encountered similar problems. They only reported estimates for γ conditional on choosing a certain value for s, rather than joint estimates for γ and s.
